Recently, Japan has been engaging frequently with Southeast Asian countries. From January 9 to 12, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba made his first official visits to Malaysia and Indonesia. Following closely, Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya visited the Philippines from January 14 to 15. During these trips, enhancing maritime security cooperation and "addressing common maritime security challenges" became recurring topics raised by Japanese officials.
In an exclusive interview with VSCS, Yang Bojiang, Director of the Institute of Japanese Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, stated that strengthening cooperation with Southeast Asia is both a continuation of Japan's foreign policy and an effort to expand its diplomatic space in response to uncertainties following the new U.S. administration. Yang also noted that Southeast Asian countries are generally clear-eyed about Japan's attempts to use maritime security cooperation to intervene in the South China Sea disputes.
Japan's Multiple Strategic Considerations in Focusing on Southeast Asia
On January 10, 2025, Prime Minister of Malaysia Anwar Ibrahim (right), meets with Shigeru Ishiba, the Prime Minister of Japan (left)
Before Ishiba’s visit, Japanese media pointed out that, as ASEAN’s economic scale is set to surpass Japan’s, Japan is losing its presence in Southeast Asia, making it urgent to rebuild relations with ASEAN.
Historically, Japan has a tradition of using Southeast Asia as a diplomatic breakthrough. The Fukuda Doctrine, born from Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda’s 1977 speech in Manila, emphasized sincere dialogue with ASEAN countries, marking the formal establishment of Japan’s Southeast Asia diplomacy and supporting Japan’s economic and political influence in the region.
Yang highlighted that recent Japanese cabinets, from Shinzo Abe to Yoshihide Suga, have made Southeast Asia a priority for their first official visits, underscoring Japan’s consistent and clear strategic emphasis on the region. Ishiba’s actions align with this long-standing diplomatic approach, reflecting Japan’s enduring foreign policy considerations.
"Another significant factor is Trump returning to power, which would introduce uncertainties into Japan’s external environment, including its economic growth, security policies, and diplomatic relations. Japan will need to strengthen multilateral diplomacy to safeguard and expand its diplomatic flexibility." Yang Bojiang further noted that Japan’s strategic intentions are not singular, but influenced by various factors, including its strategy towards China.
Pushing "Military Assistance": Japan's Increased Involvement in the South China Sea
On January 11, 2025, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto (right) and Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba (left) attend a joint press conference
According to media reports, during his talks with Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar, Ishiba Shigeru expressed a desire to deepen cooperation in maritime security with Malaysia, a key maritime passage. In Indonesia, Ishiba announced Japan's donation of two high-speed patrol boats to help strengthen Indonesia’s maritime defense capabilities.
During a meeting with the Philippine Foreign Minister, Takeshi Iwaya reiterated Japan’s commitment to continuing development aid to the Philippines and supporting its maritime security capabilities. In a subsequent press conference, Takeshi Iwaya expressed concerns over the South China Sea, stating that “Japan strongly opposes any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or escalate regional tensions.”
Yang Bojiang pointed out that in 2023, Japan independently launched the Official Security Assistance (OSA) framework, focusing on Southeast Asian nations as key regions for support. Southeast Asia is a vital area in Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy. "It is clear that Japan has strategic intentions to increase its involvement in the South China Sea dispute, signaling a potential rise in its military presence there."
According to available data, under the OSA framework, Japan provided coast surveillance radar and communication equipment to the Philippines and Malaysia in 2023. The Philippines and Indonesia have also been included in the 2024 target countries under this framework. Ishiba’s announcement of donating high-speed patrol boats to Indonesia is a reflection of Japan’s efforts to expand maritime security cooperation with ASEAN countries.
On January 15, 2025, Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya (left) and Philippine Foreign Minister Enrique Manalo (right) attend a joint press conference
It is noteworthy that the Philippines’ largest and most advanced coast guard vessel, 9701, which was illegally stationed in China's Spratly Islands in 2024, was purchased from Japan. Yang Bojiang further mentioned that during the uncertain period of U.S. Southeast Asia policy under the Trump administration, Japan may increase the sale and export of military equipment to Southeast Asian nations, including these specifically targeted maritime assets, which will likely exacerbate regional instability.
Stability in the South China Sea: The Collective Aspiration of Southeast Asian Countries
Despite the escalation of tensions in the South China Sea in 2024 due to continued provocations from the Philippines, maintaining peace and stability in the region remains the mainstream consensus among ASEAN countries.
As the first country visited by Shigeru Ishiba, Malaysia is also set to hold the ASEAN Chairmanship in 2025. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has repeatedly called for resolving the South China Sea dispute through diplomacy and emphasized opposition to external interference.
After Takeshi Iwaya concluded his visit to the Philippines, China and the Philippines held the 10th meeting of the Bilateral Consultation Mechanism on the South China Sea, reaffirming the importance of maintaining peace and stability in the region, which is in the shared interest of regional countries, including China and the Philippines.
On January 16, 2025, the 10th meeting of the China-Philippines Bilateral Consultation Mechanism (BCM) on the South China Sea is held in Xiamen, Fujian Province
Yang Bojiang believes that for the countries involved in the South China Sea dispute, Japan’s proactive gestures of goodwill and support are mostly seen as a way to “leverage” and “take advantage” of the situation, aiming to “strengthen their bargaining power and negotiation position on the issue. This is a common phenomenon in international relations, but the ultimate goal remains to resolve the issue through diplomacy.”
Yang concluded by stating that Japan is not a party to the South China Sea dispute and that “all issues regarding the South China Sea should be resolved between the parties involved. The solution that best serves the common interests of all parties and the overall regional interests is peaceful consultation and diplomatic resolution. I believe no party wants to see direct conflict in the region.”