Recently, the U.S. Department of Defense released the summary table of its Fiscal Year 2024 “Freedom of Navigation Report”. This marks the 32nd consecutive year since 1992 that such a report has been published, once again placing China under the spotlight. 

The summary lists what the U.S. government unilaterally identifies as “excessive maritime claims,” alleging that 11 countries and regions, including China, have engaged in so-called activities that impede freedom of navigation.

According to the United States, the direct objective of the “Freedom of Navigation Program” is to “safeguard U.S. national interests in ensuring freedom of navigation while demonstrating that the United States will not acquiesce to ‘excessive maritime claims’ asserted by coastal states.” The program primarily relies on military-powered “freedom of navigation operations” to challenge “excessive maritime claims” and uphold the traditional “freedom of navigation” based on customary international law. The U.S. argues that “failure to challenge these claims would impair the rights and freedoms of all nations to use the oceans and airspace under international law.”  

Comics “ ’Unrestricted’ Reckless Abuse of Power” 

Since 1991, the U.S. Department of Defense has used its annual reports to detail the implementation of the “Freedom of Navigation Program” by the U.S. Navy, including the targeted countries and the reasons for such actions. These claims are familiar to those following the South China Sea issue, but the 2024 version is more selective than the 2023 report.

The number of targeted countries and regions has been reduced from 19 in 2023 to 11 in 2024, with all but three located in Asia. Notably, the Philippines, which has engaged in similar practices in the South China Sea, is excluded from the list.  

This summary once again singles out China as the primary target of U.S. “freedom of navigation operations,” with the South China Sea being a key area for such activities. The U.S. claims that four Chinese practices in the South China Sea and East China Sea are “inconsistent with international law,” including requirements for “prior approval or notification for foreign warships entering territorial seas for innocent passage,” restrictions on “foreign aircraft flying through Air Defense Identification Zones without intent to enter a country’s airspace,” “straight baselines” that allegedly violate international law, and “historic rights in the South China Sea.”  

U.S. Navy destroyer USS Higgins  

As if to validate the report’s content, within two days of the summary’s release, the U.S. Navy destroyer USS Higgins illegally entered the territorial waters of China’s Huangyan Dao without the Chinese government’s approval. Meanwhile, the U.S. has turned a blind eye to the Philippines’ repeated dangerous navigation activities and “excessive maritime claims” in the South China Sea this year.

Even more egregiously, the U.S. has ignored Israel’s naval and aerial blockade of the Mediterranean waters near the Gaza Strip since 2009, which has caused shocking humanitarian disasters. The changes and selective targeting in the “freedom of navigation operations” clearly demonstrate that the U.S. actions are not about upholding a rules-based international order but rather an order based on U.S. rules.

The U.S. government’s unilateral identification of “excessive maritime claims,” which serves as the so-called basis for its “freedom of navigation operations,” is inconsistent with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Issues such as whether foreign warships enjoy the right of innocent passage in the territorial seas of coastal states and whether military activities by foreign warships in the exclusive economic zones and continental shelves of coastal states should be restricted are matters not explicitly regulated by UNCLOS. These cannot be unilaterally determined by one country as “excessive maritime claims.”

As a non-State party to UNCLOS, the U.S. pays lip service to upholding the law of the sea, which is utterly ridiculous. Of course, it is no surprise that the U.S., long acting from a position of strength, considers itself the ultimate arbiter of global affairs.

UNCLOS is not the only set of international law rules governing global oceans and airspace. The preamble of the Convention “affirms that matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general international law.”

For example, the continuous development of beyond-visual-range radar, data links, medium and long-range missiles, and unmanned combat systems has overturned understanding of combat space and information in traditional military operations. Military surveys and close-in reconnaissance by foreign military vessels or aircraft in exclusive economic zones pose far greater threats to coastal states than what was envisaged under the 1982 UNCLOS.

Moreover, such activities intentionally interfere with fishing operations. Customary international law and the UN Charter affirm that sovereign states have the right to self-preservation and may take all necessary measures to prevent and deter harmful actions by other countries to safeguard their national security and defense needs.

The unease and discomfort caused by U.S. “freedom of navigation operations” in the international community are also reflected in their implementation. The U.S. has long believed that only military actions can avoid constituting so-called acquiescence to other countries’ maritime claims. However, as early as the 2008 Pedra Branca case, the International Court of Justice confirmed that mere diplomatic statements could produce the same legal effect. By refusing to comply with coastal states’ domestic legislation on territorial sea notification systems and repeatedly arbitrarily entering their territorial seas, U.S. warships engage in military provocations.

These actions essentially demonstrate U.S. military presence and power projection in regions of interest, including leveraging opportunities to justify military expenditures shouldered by U.S. taxpayers. The essence of the U.S.-claimed “freedom of navigation” is the freedom to project military power and the freedom to assert American exceptionalism.

In the maritime and aerial domains targeted by the U.S. “Freedom of Navigation Program,” the dispute is not between the U.S. and other countries regarding genuine maritime or navigation rights. Rather, disputes may exist among coastal states within these regions, and the U.S., as an external power, acts as a shit-stirrer, reigniting tensions in previously calming disputes and exacerbating already intense conflicts. 

On August 11, 2025, the Philippine Coast Guard 4406 intrudes into the waters near China's Huangyan Dao and dangerously approached Chinese vessels. 

Shortly after the release of the U.S. report, on August 11, several Philippine official and fishery patrol vessels intruded into the waters of China’s Huangyan Dao. This is not an isolated incident but part of a series of provocative actions by the Philippines in the South China Sea in recent years. Whenever the Philippines creates friction around Huangyan Dao or Ren’ai Jiao, the U.S. is often seen lurking in the background, creating the perception of a joint U.S.-Philippine challenge to China’s sovereignty.

The illegal entry of the U.S. Navy destroyer USS Higgins into the territorial waters of Huangyan Dao without Chinese government approval on August 13 is the latest example. By disregarding mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of disputes, U.S. “freedom of navigation operations” not only fail to contribute to peaceful dispute resolution but also exacerbate conflicts and undermine the international community’s collective efforts to build a maritime order.

The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea explicitly requires countries to refrain from actions that complicate or escalate the situation. The South China Sea needs cooperation, mutual trust, and stability, not aggression and provocation. It should not become a battleground for regional conflicts or great power rivalry.

In the future, the U.S. should seriously consider how to interact with other countries and what role it should play in the international community when its relative strength and military power can no longer support its unilateral narratives and actions.

(Author: Chen Xifeng, Associate professor of School of Law of Xiamen University)