Recently, the Philippines has frequently taken provocative actions in the South China Sea. After repeated failed attempts to intrude into waters near Huangyan Dao and the illegal landing on Tiexian Jiao in late April, the Philippines on May 21 again sent government vessels, under the pretext of conducting ecological surveys, into China’s sovereign waters near Zhubi Jiao and Tiexian Jiao in the Nansha Qundao. They even dispatched personnel to land on Tiexian Jiao, seriously infringing upon China’s sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction in the South China Sea. In response, China maintained close monitoring and exercised lawful maritime control and necessary verification. During the incident, Philippine vessel 3002 ignored warnings and deliberately collided with China Coast Guard ship 21559.

It is important to note that these actions are neither accidental nor isolated incidents. Rather, they reflect the Marcos administration’s deliberate and unilateral approach to the South China Sea issue, marked by a clear policy shift toward sustained and systematic infringements. The Marcos government has previously declared its intention to formulate a long-term policy of full-scale confrontation with China in the South China Sea, aiming to turn its current aggressive stance into a lasting national strategy that shapes future Philippine policy choices. This indicates that, at least for the foreseeable future, the Philippines is likely to carry out increasingly provocative actions to systematically challenge China’s lawful presence and control in disputed areas.

The Marcos administration’s repeated incursions into uninhabited islands and adjacent waters, along with its formulation of a so-called long-term policy, are in fact driven by an attempt to mask its repeated failures through increasingly aggressive actions. It also reflects the administration’s anxiety to demonstrate its “value” to certain extra-regional powers. The main objective behind Manila’s provocations in the South China Sea is to stir up domestic and international opinion, heighten tensions in the region, and thereby inflame nationalist sentiment for gains in occasions such as midterm elections, while catering to the strategic needs of specific external countries by hyping the outdated “China threat” narrative and attempting to disrupt the regional order around China. However, Manila was obviously doing bad on both fronts. 

Despite its continued theatrics and shifting tactics in the South China Sea, China’s lawful, measured, and restrained response has prevented any major escalation—let alone bringing any real benefit to the Philippines. Domestically, the Marcos administration’s hardline stance on the South China Sea has done little to deflect public dissatisfaction over livelihood issues and has not become a political asset in elections. Internationally, the Philippines’ frequent maneuvering has failed to resonate with other ASEAN members and has instead led to diminished international attention and a decline in its image. In this context, the Marcos administration, having gone all in, feels compelled to make further missteps in order to cover up the strategic misjudgments in its South China Sea policy and to convince certain foreign powers that it still holds value in their efforts to contain and pressure China.

In fact, the Marcos administration’s push for a “long-term policy” of aggressive infringement in the South China Sea lacks legal basis, political support, and implementation capacity. It is neither profitable nor sustainable. Legally, China holds sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and enjoys sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the adjacent waters in accordance with their legal status. The Philippines’ general invocation of the illegal and invalid South China Sea arbitration ruling as a guiding principle to unilaterally advance its claims disregards historical facts and violates international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Politically, the Marcos administration has ignored the real needs of its people, choosing instead to serve the directives of certain extra-regional powers. This has triggered public backlash now and willcannot bind future Philippine governments to follow its misguided and extreme South China Sea policy. In terms of execution, the Philippines lacks the capability to sustain high-intensity maritime provocations under China’s lawful control, and extra-regional countries are unlikely to take risks or commit long-term resources on its behalf.

It is therefore clear that the Philippines’ recent aggressive actions in the South China Sea, along with its attempt to normalize such behavior, are nothing more than a desperate gamble by the Marcos administration under internal and external pressure. Masking failure and currying favor with foreign powers by recklessly wagering national interests on a losing bet neither aligns with the expectations of the Filipino people nor garners support from other South China Sea countries. The Marcos administration should realize, or in fact, it has long realized, that in this gambling game, it will not be China, nor the extra-regional powers that will ultimately swallow the bitter fruit, but the Philippines itself.​