The Shangri-La Dialogue 2025 has just concluded. For over a decade, this international multilateral platform, often dubbed “Asia’s Security Summit”, has routinely centered its agenda on criticizing China. But rarely has it done so with the level of absurdity seen this year. Compared to U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s recycled narrative of the “China threat,” Philippine Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro’s declaration of a South China Sea policy based on “strategic blackmail” appeared strikingly novel and left a strong impression on the international audience.

(Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro speaks in the fifth plenary session entitled “Cross-regional Security Interlinkages” during the 22nd IISS Shangri-La Dialogue at the Shangri-La Hotel on June 01, 2025 in Singapore. /CFP)

Teodoro unjustly and prejudicially blamed regional instability in the Indo-Pacific, including the South China Sea, on China’s growing strength, equating China’s law enforcement actions, carried out in accordance with historical facts and international law, with “bullying.” As Defense Secretary, Teodoro’s remarks reflect the broader views of the Philippine defense establishment and effectively signal the Marcos Jr. administration’s stance on the South China Sea, revealing the strategic logic currently guiding Philippine decision-making on this issue.

First, “Small country, big moral.” The Philippines frequently invokes the so-called rules-based international order while portraying itself as a small country, using moral arguments to pressure larger states. It implicitly suggests that China has a natural obligation to make concessions in the South China Sea, ignoring the principle of fairness emphasized in the international legal system centered on international law.

Second, “Major powers defending their interests is evil; small countries doing so is just.” Teodoro characterizes China’s legitimate law enforcement and maritime rights protection in the South China Sea as “bullying” of smaller neighbors, implying a betrayal of China’s pledge of “peaceful rise.” In doing so, he deliberately paints China’s actions, firmly grounded in international law, as “evil,” while casting the unilateral moves of the Philippine Navy, Coast Guard, and public service vessels around Huangyan Dao and the Nansha Qundao as “good.” In other words, although both China and the Philippines cite international law to justify their actions in the South China Sea, the Philippine narrative reduces this to a moral binary in which China, as a major power, is inherently “bad,” while the Philippines, as a small country, is inherently “good.”

Third, “China’s rise is historically inevitable, but normatively unacceptable.” As China’s economy, technology, military, and soft power continue to grow, its emergence as a major regional power is a natural outcome of historical development. Yet the Philippines expresses skepticism and dissatisfaction with this reality, accusing China of breaking its “promise” and labeling its rise to superpower status as the “original sin” behind worsening China-U.S. strategic rivalry and the deteriorating regional and global security environment. Teodoro’s underlying message is clear: even if China’s rise is inevitable, it should abandon the ambition altogether.

In fact, the Philippines has increasingly relied on narrative framing to portray itself as a vulnerable “small country” or “underdog” in the South China Sea dispute, aiming to win international sympathy and support. This moral positioning attempts to pressure China into restraint, or even concessions, during on-the-ground encounters over South China Sea features such as Huangyan Dao, Ren’ai Jiao, and Tiexian Jiao. Manila has even threatened a “second arbitration” against China, accusing it of causing ecological damage in the South China Sea.

Ironically, earlier this month, the Philippines organized and mobilized fishing vessels to operate near Huangyan Dao under the pretext of protesting China’s annual fishing moratorium. This is not the first time Manila has prioritized political motives over environmental protection by orchestrating fishing activities whenever China enforces its fishing ban. At the core of this behavior is the same “small-country exceptionalism.” The Philippines claims that China’s moratorium harms Filipino fishermen’s livelihoods, attempting to justify its politically driven fishing operations under a moralistic banner of “ethical superiority.”

The Philippines’ blackmail is a classic example of gray zone tactics. It seeks to exploit the international community’s instinctive sympathy for the perceived weak, manipulate global opinion through false and misleading narratives, and leverage support from the U.S. and other Western countries to pressure and constrain China’s policy choices in the South China Sea. While this approach may appear logically sound on the surface, it in fact reflects a mindset of strategic opportunism, or even brinkmanship, within the Philippine policy community. More troublingly, it risks undermining the international rules-based order established after World War II and forces the global community to confront a critical question: What should major powers do when small countries act irresponsibly?

Indeed, if not for the diplomatic, legal, military, and media support provided by the U.S. and other Western countries, motivated by the desire to use the Philippines as a pawn to contain China, the Marcos Jr. administration would likely have shown more self-restraint and not pursued this strategy of “strategic blackmail.”

At the Shangri-La Dialogue, Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro attempted to justify the Philippines’ role as a willing foot soldier in the U.S. strategy to contain China, trying to obscure the fact that the country has long lost strategic autonomy.

(US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, Australia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Richard Marles, Japan’s Minister of Defense Nakatani Gen, and Philippines Secretary of National Defense Gilberto Teodoro Jr. pose for photos following their multilateral meeting on the sidelines of the International Institute for Strategic Studies Shangri-La Dialogue Defence Summit in Singapore, 31 May 2025. /CFP) 

However, the joint statement issued by the defense ministers of the U.S., Japan, Australia, and the Philippines speaks for itself. The Marcos Jr. administration’s “strategic blackmail” over the South China Sea has received tacit approval, open support, and perhaps even covert encouragement from the West, just one of many tools the U.S. employs in its broader effort to reshape the post–World War II international order.

(Author: Chen Xiangmiao, Special Invited Researcher of the CMG Expert Committee on South China Sea Studies, Director of Center for South China Sea History and Culture, National Institute for South China Sea Studies)