Against the backdrop of profound global changes unseen in a century, the world in 2025 remains shrouded in uncertainty. In the South China Sea region, despite the Philippines’ continued introduction of external military forces into the area, persistent provocative actions that heighten maritime security risks, and the deliberate promotion of false South China Sea narratives to mislead international perceptions, the overall situation in the South China Sea has remained generally stable and under control.

The year 2026 marks the fifth anniversary of the establishment of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between China and ASEAN. It's also a pivotal year for China and ASEAN countries to advance the conclusion of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, while coinciding with the tenth anniversary of the so-called "South China Sea arbitration ruling." 

How should China and ASEAN countries work together to turn the vision of a South China Sea of peace, cooperation, and friendship into reality? The Voice of the South China Sea（VSCS）conducted interviews with scholars from multiple countries in the region. Drawing on perspectives from international relations, geopolitics, maritime disputes, and cooperation, these diverse viewpoints help us jointly chart the course for the South China Sea in the new year.

Wu Shicun：Chairman of The Huayang Center for Maritime Cooperation and Ocean Governance; Chair of the Academic Committee of National Institute for South China Sea Studies

Ruhanas Harun：Professor at the Department of International Relations, Security and Law, National Defence, University of Malaysia

Lucio Pitlo：President of Philippine Association for Chinese Studies, and Research Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Pathways to Progress Foundation

Muhammad Habib：Researcher at the Department of International Relations, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Indonesia

Wu Shicun: Staying Alert to Rising Risks and Shaping the Narrative

The overall peace and stability in the South China Sea in 2025 has not undergone a fundamental reversal. However, localized and phase-based turbulence and friction have increased markedly, making the situation more complex. This can be mainly attributed to three factors.

（Wu Shicun takes interview with VSCS)

First, the United States has completely abandoned its so-called “neutral” policy on the South China Sea and is openly playing the “South China Sea card” to contain China. This has encouraged a small number of regional countries, including the Philippines, to adopt more aggressive infringing and provocative actions.

Second, the negative impact of the "South China Sea arbitration ruling" continues to spill over. This illegal ruling has been treated by a few regional countries as a so-called legal benchmark for their infringing actions, continuously eroding regional mutual trust. 

Third, there is competition surrounding the window period for negotiations on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC). China and ASEAN countries have set a target of concluding the COC by the end of 2026. However, for certain claimant states, the period before the COC is finalized is viewed as a “last window” to consolidate and expand their vested interests. This adds further uncertainty and risk to the South China Sea situation in 2026.

Looking back at the situation in the South China Sea in 2025, China has achieved notable results in countering maritime provocations and expanding its “toolbox” for safeguarding maritime rights. At the same time, it must be recognized that the fundamental contest in the South China Sea disputes lies in the leadership over rules and order. In this regard, we need a coordinated, multi-pronged approach to enhance China’s narrative capacity on the South China Sea and break Western discourse dominance. 

This includes systematically articulating the legal foundations of China’s historical rights in the South China Sea and the arrangements of the postwar international order, as well as comprehensively exposing the damaging effects of the illegal ruling on regional peace, bilateral relations, and the maritime order. At the same time, in response to serious infringing and provocative actions, China must adopt firm and forceful countermeasures that impose appropriate costs, thereby clearly establishing red lines for safeguarding sovereignty, rights, and the rules-based order.

Ruhanas Harun: Moving Beyond Disputes and Advancing Pragmatic Cooperation

Over the past year, the situation in the South China Sea has been characterized by a combination of “fragile stability” and “certain uncertainties.” Although the parties to the disputes have reached a degree of consensus, this “consensus” often means agreeing to set aside differences on core claims while refraining from escalating into direct military confrontation. This has produced a state that is fragile yet relatively stable.

What cannot be overlooked is the factor of “external interference” in the South China Sea disputes, mainly from countries outside the region such as the United States and Japan. Within ASEAN, there is neither unified support for the United States nor an overall alignment with China. Member states continue to maintain independent and autonomous foreign policies. The complexity of external interference, combined with divergent internal positions, constitutes a key source of uncertainty in the current situation.

In my view, the South China Sea has already waited long enough and has not moved toward war. Now is the time to move beyond political disputes and begin advancing functional cooperation in areas such as marine resources and energy, rather than remaining trapped in the mindset that political issues must be resolved first. Once countries derive tangible benefits from cooperation, such cooperation can sustain itself. As shared interests continue to accumulate, parties will think more carefully before taking unilateral and aggressive actions. This is precisely the positive prospect that pragmatic cooperation can generate.

Looking ahead to 2026, I remain cautiously optimistic. The potential of all parties has yet to be fully tapped, and peace and security in the South China Sea are ultimately achievable. The real South China Sea is not as perilous as portrayed by some media outlets, and the genuine resolution of disputes requires patience and time. War can be triggered by a declaration, but peace depends on being built day by day. In this regard, ASEAN possesses both the experience and the resilience needed to sustain that process.

Lucio Pitlo: Building Trust—The South China Sea Needs Good News

An unfortunate reality is that whenever the South China Sea is discussed, the international community tends to focus on negative news. Cooperative projects in the South China Sea, or the efforts made by various parties to manage tensions, rarely make headlines. This is a challenge that both the media and we ourselves must confront. At present, there is a trust deficit among countries along the South China Sea, and a series of maritime tensions have affected how states perceive one another. In my view, strengthening mutual trust and confidence is therefore essential. This is a long-term investment.

The South China Sea issue is indeed a key topic in Philippines–China relations and even a source of friction. Precisely for this reason, it is all the more important to continue seeking dialogue and to establish institutionalized communication channels and mechanisms to ease tensions, conduct crisis management, and pursue pragmatic cooperation. There are many areas where cooperation between the Philippines and China can be expanded, such as marine environmental protection and marine scientific research, the impact of climate change on South China Sea fisheries and biodiversity, and the development of marine renewable energy. China has leading technologies in these fields, and cooperation is worth exploring.

At the same time, the economy matters. China has been the Philippines’ largest trading partner since 2016. In areas such as infrastructure, trade, and technology investment, China can provide substantial support, which would help upgrade Philippine industries and create more jobs for the Filipino people.

Today, the Philippine government and business community continue to engage with China, especially on economic matters, and this is very important. People should look at the bigger picture and allow bilateral relations to go beyond the South China Sea issue. Some disputes take time to resolve. If conditions cannot be improved immediately, at the very least conflict must be avoided, and differences should not be allowed to become the determining factor in bilateral relations or undermine regional stability.

These will remain challenges for Manila. The Philippines should also look at the approaches taken by other ASEAN neighbors, learning how to engage effectively with China on the South China Sea issue, how to coexist, and how to build productive and healthy bilateral relations with China.

Muhammad Habib: Seize Opportunities and Harvest the “Low-Hanging Fruit”

Risks in the South China Sea region are real, and differences cannot be avoided. If these differences are not handled properly, they could easily lead to strategic miscalculations. We should therefore strengthen communication with one another to prevent unintended consequences arising from military activities or the mishandling of disputes. Indonesia is willing to actively promote dialogue among all parties, because communication and dialogue are always our first choice.

Cooperation between Indonesia and China is of great significance. China and ASEAN countries, including Indonesia, are jointly advancing multilateral economic cooperation, which is playing an important role. In the field of sustainable development, some forms of cooperation are described as “low-hanging fruit,” meaning goals that can be achieved relatively easily with limited resources or time. Indonesia looks forward to moving forward together with China in these areas, especially in blue carbon economy cooperation, where opportunities should be seized.

As an archipelagic country, Indonesia has its own development experience in maritime affairs, while China has also accumulated extensive experience in ocean governance. If we can establish an effective model of cooperation, China and Indonesia are fully capable of extending their maritime cooperation beyond the South China Sea and jointly exploring pathways for coordinated development in broader maritime areas.

In fact, the conclusion of the Agreement on Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction, known as the BBNJ Agreement, has also given us confidence. It shows that even amid current political and economic turbulence, countries can still build consensus and demonstrate collective action. On marine issues, whether for landlocked or coastal states, interests intersect and demands differ. What matters is identifying and consolidating shared interests and turning them into the foundation for cooperation.