In 2025, thankfully, the South China Sea (SCS) dispute did not erupt into open war; nevertheless, it “did not cool down.” It evolved. But that is a dangerously low bar. In the SCS, the distance between “routine patrol” and “international incident” is often measured in meters. In 2025, that distance shrank even further.

What unfolded instead was something arguably more destabilizing: a year of sustained, increasingly physical grey-zone confrontation marked by risky encounters at sea and a widening contest that spilled into the air domain, played out in full view of the international community.

The dispute no longer resembled a distant sovereignty quarrel. It became a lived, operational reality where miscalculation, injury, and escalation were no longer hypothetical. At the center of this slow-burning crisis stood the Philippines–China conflict of interests and dispute over the contested water of the SCS, which in 2025 crystallized the core dilemma of the SCS.

The confrontations between the Philippines and China, which have already intensified in recent years, have become more distributed across hotspots, more multi-domain (sea and air), and more tightly interwoven with diplomacy, coalition-building, and narrative warfare. Hence, 2025 marked several strategic milestones that changed how the dispute is being played, and how it might be managed or mismanaged in 2026 when the Philippines takes the ASEAN Chairmanship under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.

( Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. delivers a report on government investigative efforts against corruption during a press conference in Manila, Philippines, November 13, 2025. /CFP)

Setting aside both worst-case fears and best-case illusions, a realistic baseline for 2026 looks modest but consequential.

First, incremental progress on the ASEAN–China Code of Conduct (COC) is likely. Negotiations may yield a more consolidated draft text with fewer brackets, but a fully concluded, legally binding agreement will remain difficult to achieve. Core disagreements persist, particularly over geographic scope, enforcement mechanisms, and the role of third parties. The COC, as such, will continue to evolve slowly rather than decisively.

Second, operational friction will persist at established flashpoints, most notably Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Dao in Chinese), Sabina Shoal (Xianbin Jiao in Chinese) , and areas near Thitu Island (Zhongye Dao in Chinese) and Sandy Cay (Tiexian Jiao in Chinese). These locations have become normalized confrontation zones where both the Philippines and China have incentives to demonstrate resolve. The chairmanship will not remove these disputes, especially over sovereignty claims.

Third, multilateral military presence activities will likely expand. Joint patrols, military exercises, and coast guard drills involving the Philippines and its Western partners, including Japan, will continue, further embedding the SCS dispute within broader Indo-Pacific strategic competition and rivalry. Rather than “de-internationalizing” the dispute, 2026 will likely see it remain tightly interwoven with alliance dynamics.  

Whereas sovereignty settlements will not constitute a realistic best-case scenario for 2026.  Instead, success should be defined as making the dispute safer, more predictable, and more rules-bound. 
 

A credible pathway toward a COC must be paired with practical risk-reduction instruments. Even if a final COC remains elusive, a safety or incidents-at-sea annex could be a meaningful breakthrough.

Crisis-management architecture must function reliably. The true test of 2026 will not be summit communiqués, but what happens during the subsequent dangerous encounter. Reliable hotlines between coast guards and navies, rapid clarification mechanisms when misinformation spreads, and agreed procedures for rescue, towing, and medical aid are the most underappreciated and most important metrics of success.

The Philippines’ core challenge in 2026 is unavoidable. As a claimant, Manila will continue asserting its maritime rights through presence, patrols, and public exposure of confrontations. As ASEAN chair, it must preserve unity, neutrality, and centrality, especially when some member states prioritize stability and economic ties over confrontation, and when China resists what it views as further “internationalization” of the SCS.

This dual role requires discipline rather than political grandstanding. The ASEAN chairmanship of the Philippines will therefore demand calibrated leadership, firm on principles, restrained in rhetoric, and relentlessly focused on process.

The key lesson of 2025 is sobering but clear. While the SCS can remain below the threshold of war, it does not remain below the threshold of danger. If 2026 is to be judged a success, it will not be because sovereignty disputes are resolved. It will be because accidents are managed, and crisis pathways function.

As expectations rise ahead of the Philippine 2026 ASEAN chairmanship, it bears repeating: no ASEAN chair can compel unilateral restraint, and no single year can undo decades of rivalry. But 2026 still matters because the alternative is drift.

The most dangerous trajectory for the SCS is not sudden war, but the quiet acceptance of skirmishes and hazardous encounters at sea as tools of statecraft. That is the strategic Rubicon the region cannot afford to cross unnoticed. The question for 2026, then, is not whether the SCS will change. It already has. The real question is whether the Philippines' ASEAN chairmanship can prevent it from worsening.

(Author: Anna Malindog-Uy，Vice President for External Affairs of the Asian Century Philippines Strategic Studies Institute, Special Invited Researcher at CMG Expert Committee on South China Sea Studies)