Recently, the Philippines took advantage of its role as chair of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) to organize naval vessels from eight countries both within and outside the region for joint military exercises in the waters near Huangyan Dao. In response, China conducted joint exercises with its navy and coast guard in the waters near Huangyan Dao on September 27.

Manila has engaged in unilateral actions around Huangyan Dao on more than a few occasions, but using a multilateral occasion to organize multilateral joint military drills to assert its so-called “claims” is still rare. China’s decision to hold joint exercises during an important holiday is by no means a simple assertion of sovereignty and maritime rights and interests — it is another sharp reminder to the Marcos administration: testing China’s patience on Huangyan Dao is anything but wise.

On September 27, 2026, multiple Chinese Coast Guard vessels conducted exercises in the waters near Huangyan Dao.

Why Huangyan Dao?

Over the past few years, both China and the Philippines have tried to shape each other’s South China Sea policies through interaction, and nowhere has this been more evident than on the Huangyan Dao issue. In fact, it is the Philippines’ repeated aggressive unilateral actions that have shaped the current situation on Huangyan Dao; China has built its maritime rights-protection fortress through repeated law enforcement and rights-defense operations.

As early as 1999, the Philippines tried to repeat its trick at Ren’ai Jiao by illegally grounding a vessel to occupy Huangyan Dao de facto, but ultimately failed. In 2012, the Philippines deliberately provoked the “China-Philippines Huangyan Dao standoff,” only to have the stone fall on its own foot, forcing China to strengthen its actual control over Huangyan Dao. Manila’s plan to de facto occupy Huangyan Dao through “gray-zone” actions such as coast guard patrols and fishing activities was thereby shattered.

For a long period after 2012, there was no shortage of clamor in Philippine government and congressional circles and across the political spectrum about “returning” to Huangyan Dao. But from the Aquino III administration to the Duterte administration, both chose a strategy of accepting reality and maintaining a presence. At that time, Filipino fishermen maintained stable fishing activities in the waters near Huangyan Dao. Although the Philippines still maintained its so-called “sovereignty claim” over Huangyan Dao, China and the Philippines had formed a tacit understanding based on a balance of interests.

After the Marcos administration came to power, the balance of China-Philippines interaction in the South China Sea was broken by the Philippines’ new South China Sea policy. In the second half of 2023, the Philippine government began dispatching naval vessels, coast guard ships, and fishery administration vessels (under the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources) to frequently intrude into Huangyan Dao, attempting to assert to the international community that “the Philippines is returning to Huangyan Dao.” Not only that, in November 2024 the Philippines promulgated and implemented the so-called “Maritime Zones Act,” incorporating Huangyan Dao into its territorial map.

Based on the incontrovertible fact that Huangyan Dao is Chinese territory, and in response to the Philippine side and in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, China announced the territorial sea baselines of Huangyan Dao on November 10, 2024. In August 2025, China established a national-level nature reserve on Huangyan Dao. On August 1, 2026, multiple Chinese departments jointly issued the “Measures for the Administration of the Huangyan Dao National Nature Reserve,” aiming to further enhance the construction and management level of the Huangyan Dao National Nature Reserve.

In fact, from the announcement of the territorial sea baselines of Huangyan Dao to the establishment of the nature reserve, China has fully demonstrated the defensive nature of its South China Sea policy. Even in the face of Philippine aggressiveness, it still chooses measures aimed at preventing the escalation of on-site confrontation and managing bilateral disputes (such as resource development). However, the Philippines neither accepts China’s strengthening of control through civilian measures nor reconciles itself to it. It has intensified actions such as intruding into territorial airspace, forcibly entering territorial waters, dangerous approaches, and non-standard operations, while repeatedly conducting military operations covering the waters of Huangyan Dao jointly with the United States and other countries.

On September 23, 2026, the Philippines, taking advantage of its role as ASEAN chair and chair of the 2026 ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting, rallied naval vessels from multiple countries for joint exercises in the waters near Huangyan Dao.

On September 23, the Philippines, taking advantage of its role as ASEAN chair and chair of the 2026 ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting, rallied naval vessels from the United States, Japan, Australia, India, New Zealand, Singapore, and Brunei for joint exercises in the waters near Huangyan Dao. This exercise challenged China’s interests in two ways: it violated China’s legitimate rights under international law in the waters of Huangyan Dao, and it constituted a potential challenge to China’s defense and security. The Chinese navy and coast guard drills were a response to the threats and challenges signaled by the Philippines.

China Has Cast a “Net from Heaven” Over Huangyan Dao

The Huangyan Dao issue bears on China’s sovereignty, maritime jurisdiction, and security interests. After China announced its territorial sea baselines in accordance with the Convention, established a national-level nature reserve, and promulgated corresponding administrative measures, China’s maritime rights scope and management measures in the waters of Huangyan Dao have been basically established.

At the same time, Huangyan Dao’s geographical location is extremely special. It sits directly facing the Xisha Qundao defense zone and on the main shipping route, and is vital to China’s overall territorial sovereignty and defense security. At present, China’s control over Huangyan Dao is far beyond what it once was, and it takes diverse forms. With military, police, and civilian coordination and division of labor, and coordination between sea, air, manned, and unmanned forces, a three-dimensional network sufficient to safeguard sovereignty and maritime rights and interests has already been built.

On September 27, 2026, the Southern Theater Command of the Chinese People's Liberation Army organized a joint sea and air exercise in the sea and air space around Huangyan Dao.

The division of labor between the military and coast guard is clear. This exercise further demonstrates that China has established a pattern in which the navy and coast guard each have their own roles at Huangyan Dao: the navy primarily safeguards national security interests, while the coast guard is responsible for law enforcement in accordance with the law. In particular, the exercise subjects were clearly differentiated in design: the navy was responsible for reconnaissance and early warning, rapid maneuver, and joint search and rescue, while the coast guard drilled actions in law enforcement links such as boarding and inspection, interdiction of attempts to force through, and compulsory towing.

Sea and air forces operate in integrated joint operations. In this exercise, China deployed the Qinghaihu, a comprehensive supply ship known as a “mobile island at sea,” as well as the guided-missile frigates Yulin and Tianmen, and early warning aircraft and other types of warplanes, coordinating with the coast guard’s Wanshan (the coast guard formation command ship), Chuanshan, and Sifang, forming an operational network covering the surrounding sea and airspace. This demonstrates that China has already built an integrated sea-air operational system in the South China Sea that can effectively deter intrusions by the Philippines and other countries.

On September 27, 2026, a new type of unmanned aerial vehicle flew to the airspace around Huangyan Dao to carry out a sea and air reconnaissance mission.

Manned and unmanned systems operate in coordination. This exercise also rarely deployed strategic drones with high-altitude, high-speed, and long-endurance reconnaissance capabilities, which, together with early warning aircraft, provided intelligence support for the surface operations of navy and coast guard vessels. In fact, with the support of the United States and some other countries outside the region, the Philippines has already deployed small tactical unmanned surface vessels and drones in the waters of Huangyan Dao. China’s addition of unmanned combat systems to the joint military-police sea-air exercise fully demonstrates its countermeasures against the Philippines and once again shows that China will improve its tactical arrangements in strategic and tactical interactions.

Highly realistic scenario design. Facing China’s overwhelming sea and air superiority, the Philippines frequently adopts “gray-zone” tactics, using “asymmetric” forces to conduct close-in infringements and reconnaissance, organizing fishing boats to forcibly intrude under the pretext of fishing, with official vessels and coast guard ships following closely behind, ostensibly to provide “protection,” approaching and even intruding into the territorial waters of Huangyan Dao and approaching the lagoon entrance. The Philippines also implements a “maritime domain awareness plan,” monitoring the number and activity signs of Chinese military, police, and fishing vessels through means such as aerial overflights. The scenarios designed for this exercise are all highly close to the characteristics of Philippine infringements. For example, interdiction and boarding inspection, blocking attempts to force through, and forced disengagement target three possible situations, including Philippine vessels attempting to force their way into territorial waters and refusing to leave after lingering there. At the same time, naval air power has filled the gap in China’s insufficient air and maritime domain awareness capability around Huangyan Dao.

On September 27, 2026, the China Coast Guard conducted exercises in the waters near Huangyan Dao to test multi-ship coordination, rapid response, and emergency handling capabilities.

Time for the Philippines to Drop Its Huangyan Dao Illusion

The Philippines’ repeated actions around Huangyan Dao are essentially testing China’s bottom line, testing China’s determination to safeguard territorial sovereignty, maritime rights and interests, and national security, and testing China’s patience. China’s attitude and position have long been clear. The will and determination to safeguard rights and interests and national security cannot be changed by the Philippines’ stubborn persistence. On the contrary, China still has many cards to play. If the Philippines continues to refuse to see reason, China can still escalate its maritime response strategy.

China has given opportunities, but the Philippine side has not cherished them. Some in Philippine strategic circles have long clamored that China should not interfere with Filipino fishermen’s traditional fishing rights in the waters of Huangyan Dao. But in fact, China did, from a humanitarian perspective, tacitly allow Filipino fishermen to conduct fishing activities in the waters of Huangyan Dao from 2012 to 2023. The Marcos administration’s unilateral actions have forced China to escalate control measures, and have also caused Filipino fishermen to lose this humanitarian assistance.

Huangyan Dao is an inherent territory of China.

The Philippine side is trying to test China’s patience and has not learned lessons from failed cases. In the 2012 Huangyan Dao standoff, the Philippine side clearly touched and even crossed a red line, openly detaining Chinese fishermen and subjecting them to inhumane treatment. The measures China took in handling the incident already made its position clear: sovereignty, maritime rights and interests, and national security interests cannot be touched.

The Philippine side should have long abandoned its illusion about Huangyan Dao, and even more so should not have broken the tacit understanding and balance between China and the Philippines. Facts since 2012 have clearly shown that in China-Philippines interaction, once the balance is broken, the Philippine side’s attempts to escalate declaratory measures will infringe on China’s rights and prompt China to take corresponding rights-protection measures and even stricter control measures. If the Philippines remains obstinate and recklessly exhausts China’s restraint, it will undoubtedly push China into a corner where it “has no choice.”

(Author: Chen Xiangmiao, Research Fellow at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, Special Invited Research Fellow of CMG’s “Expert Committee on South China Sea Studies”)